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State, Dep’t of Corr. v. DeRosa, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 37 (July 9, 2020)1
Petition for Judicial Review: Personal service and alternative means of service
Summary
The Court found that a petition for judicial review of a final judgment in an administrative
proceeding does not have to be personally served to all parties involved. The Court determined
that a petition for judicial review is best viewed as a post-complaint filing and thus a more relaxed
standard of service by mail will suffice.

Background
The Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) fired respondent Patricia DeRosa.
DeRosa then requested a hearing and the hearing officer reversed the firing and reinstated the
respondent back to her employment with NDOC. NDOC then filed a petition for judicial review
of this decision with the district court and served DeRosa’s attorney by mail in accordance with
NRCP 5(b).
Four months after the filing of the petition, DeRosa moved to dismiss the petition for lack
of proper service. She claimed that the relevant statute, NRS 233B.130(5), required petitions for
judicial review to be personally served on all parties and that NDOC failed to comply with this
when it only mailed her attorney. NDOC filed its opposition by arguing that personal service is
unnecessary in a petition for judicial review and that service by mail is sufficient. Alternatively, it
asked the court to grant an extension to the 45-day service deadline, which had long passed, so
that it could personally serve DeRosa. The district court ruled that personal service is necessary
under NRS 233B.130(5) and denied NDOC’s request for an extension because it failed to show
good cause. NDOC appealed the district court’s decision.
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By Victor Kang.

Discussion
NRS 233B.130 allows for judicial review of an administrative agency’s decisions and
rulings and requires service of the petition for judicial review.2 However, it does not specify a
method of service.3 The Court therefore had to determine whether NRCP 4.2(a), which requires
personal service of a complaint that starts a civil action, or NRCP 5(b), which allows service by
mail on any post-complaint filings, should apply in this scenario.4 Because this analysis entailed
statutory interpretations and thus involved a question of law, the Court applied the de novo
standard of review.
NRS 233B.130(5) provides that a “petition for judicial review… must be served upon” all
parties involved but does not specify a method of service.5 Therefore, the Court had to decide
whether NRCP 4.2(a) requirement of personal service applied or NRCP 5(b) permission of service
by mail sufficed.6 This necessarily entailed an analysis of whether a petition for judicial review is
categorized as a complaint that starts a civil action or as a post-complaint filing.
The Court held that a petition for judicial review is best understood as a post-complaint
filing because the parties are already aware of the underlying matter in the proceeding. The whole
purpose of personal service is to make sure the defendant is properly aware that a suit has been
brought against him and that he has an opportunity to defend himself. A petition for judicial review
is a post-complaint filing that involves a continuing legal proceeding and the parties involved are
already aware of the issues. Thus, personal service is unnecessary and the more flexible standard
of service by mail as outlined by NRCP 5(b) is sufficient in this context.
Conclusion
The Court held that NDOC complied with NRS 233B.130(5) by mailing DeRosa’s attorney
with service. It therefore reversed and remanded the district court’s finding that NDOC had to
personally serve DeRosa.
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